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Abstract: The effectiveness and success of benefit-sharing measures to date, particularly in contributing towards the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, has been questionable. This is likely related to the degree of beneficial
impacts versus burden on the users and regulatory authorities in terms of administrative complexities. It is, therefore, timely
to reconsider which forms of benefit-sharing may most favourably balance the associated beneficial and burdensome aspects.
The aim of this paper is to develop and demonstrate a benefit-sharing balance methodology which can be used as a tool to
help decision-makers to select options in an objective and transparent manner. Application in the biodiversity beyond national
jurisdiction context provides a useful example of how this tool can be used. Results suggest that sharing of genetic sequence
data and research results provide the most favourable balance in terms of non-monetary benefit sharing, whilst the most
favourable monetary benefit-sharing options were associated with research funding and salaries. The benefit-sharing balance
methodology presented here provides a useful tool and starting point, which can be built upon in the future, to include more
detailed information gathered from expert groups to consolidate the perceived balance of beneficial impacts versus burden.
In addition, the equation can be tailored according to different policy settings where different benefit-sharing factors may be
more appropriate. Ultimately, use of this tool could help to enhance implementation of benefit-sharing policies/legislation
with greater potential to balance beneficial impacts with associated burden, thereby enhancing workability of the access and
benefit-sharing system as a whole.
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Introduction
According to Article 1 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD, 1992), the objective of the Convention is
‘the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources’1.
∗Corresponding author: Jane Eva Collins
(jane.collins@abs-int.eu)
1 Article 1, (CBD, 1992): ‘The objectives of this Convention, to be
pursued in accordance with its relevant provisions, are the conservation
Article 15.7 of the Convention takes a step further
by stating that Parties shall take measures to share
benefits such as results of research and development
(R&D) and benefits arising from commercial and other
utilization of genetic resources (CBD, 1992). However,
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of
genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources
and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account
all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate
funding.’
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despite attempts made by authors such as Morgera
(2014), there is as yet no specific, internationally agreed
legal definition of the term ‘benefit-sharing’ in the
context of utilising genetic resources (Schroeder, 2007;
Morgera and Tsioumani, 2010; Morgera, 2014; Parks,
2019). In addition, the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ are
also not clearly defined (de Jonge, 2011; Morgera,
2014). This can lead to difficulties between stakeholder
groups in terms of different interpreted definitions
and requirements associated with benefit-sharing, as
well as differences in motivation with respect to the
notion (de Jonge, 2009, 2011). Nonetheless, the Nagoya
Protocol and other genetic resource frameworks, such as
the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and the WHO
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework for
the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines
and other benefits, provide suggestions of what benefit-
sharing could entail (FAO, 2001; Nagoya Protocol, 2011;
World Health Organization, 2011). A list of types of non-
monetary and monetary benefits that can be shared are
listed in the Annex of the Nagoya Protocol (2011).
Negotiations for a new international legally binding
instrument (ILBI) under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) for the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ)
began in 2018. Negotiations address a ‘package’ of four
elements and cross-cutting issues. The four elements
include: marine genetic resources (MGR), including
questions on the sharing of benefits; measures such
as area-based management tools (ABMT), including
marine protected areas (MPAs); environmental impact
assessments (EIA); and capacity-building and transfer
of marine technology (UNGA Res. 72/249, UN Doc.
A/Res/72.249, 24 December 2017, para. 2.). In order
to govern MGR in areas beyond national jurisdiction
(ABNJ) and to answer questions on the sharing of
benefits, it is important to consider which benefit-
sharing options may be most appropriate in this
particular context.
Under the Nagoya Protocol, benefits should be shared
by the users of genetic resources with the provider
state, in accordance with domestic legislation (Art
5. Nagoya Protocol 2011). However, in the BBNJ
context, although the types of users may be similar,
there will be no provider of the genetic resources, since
MGR exist outside the borders of national jurisdiction.
It has not yet been agreed who the beneficiaries
will be, but could involve ‘developing states Parties,
in particular least developed countries, landlocked
developing countries, geographically disadvantaged
states, small island developing states, coastal African
states and developing middle-income countries’ (Art
11, BBNJ draft text, 2019a). In addition, since the
Nagoya Protocol applies only to areas within national
jurisdiction, the same access and benefit-sharing (ABS)
provisions do not apply to the utilisation of genetic
resources from ABNJ. As such, new benefit-sharing
options are under consideration for adoption as part of
the new BBNJ agreement (BBNJ draft text, 2019a)2.
Whilst a list of potential benefit-sharing options
can be found in the Annex of the Nagoya Protocol
(2011), the effectiveness and success of these measures,
and the ABS system as a whole, has been questioned
by stakeholders (Fedder, 2013; Pauchard, 2017; Ruiz-
Muller, 2018). Between 1996 and 2017, a total of 217
ABS agreements for commercial research and 248 for
non-commercial research were concluded (Pauchard,
2017). To date, there is a lack of evidence to
support the assumption that benefit-sharing leads to
effective conservation of biodiversity (Suneetha and
Pisupati, 2009; Pisupati and Bavikatte, 2014). In
addition, the burden on the users (such as universities
and private companies) and regulatory authorities in
terms of administrative complexity when complying
with ABS legislation and conducting benefit-sharing
can act as a disincentive for utilisation of genetic
resources, potentially limiting the benefits derived
and shared (Richerzhagen and Holm-Mueller, 2005;
Tvedt, 2013). Further challenges exist with regards
to achieving fair and equitable benefit-sharing and
sustainable development (Louafi, 2013; Tsioumani,
2018). It is timely and appropriate, therefore, to re-
evaluate how the success of implementing benefit-
sharing options are measured and reconsider which
forms may most fairly balance the positive and
burdensome associated aspects (Ruiz-Muller, 2018). In
order to understand this balance, key factors may be
used to assess the overall positive influence of a benefit-
sharing option, such as the number of beneficiaries
receiving benefits, the effect on biodiversity goals and
the long-term impacts and significance of benefit-
sharing, as well as the overall burdensome aspects, such
as the burden on the user of genetic resources and the
burden on the regulator (Tvedt, 2013; Correa, 2017;
Morgera, 2018a; Harden-Davies and Gjerde, 2019).
Consideration of the benefit-sharing options for
adoption as part of the new BBNJ agreement provides a
good opportunity to identify benefit-sharing factors and
assess the overall positive versus burdensome balance
of different benefit-sharing options. It has been noted
that of the four elements under consideration as part
of the BBNJ package, MGR including questions on
the sharing of benefits remains the most challenging
and immature element, with few detailed solutions
suggested to date (Voigt-Hanssen, 2018). This is to be
expected given the different stakeholder perspectives,
goals and concerns Collins et al (2020). However, review
of non-monetary and monetary benefit-sharing options
in light of benefit-sharing factors and understanding of
which measures may provide the most fair and balanced
outcome could provide a useful platform on which
negotiatons can progress (BBNJ, 2019a; Sirakaya, 2019;
Collins et al, 2020).
2 See Part II, Article 11 ‘[Fair and equitable] sharing of benefits’, Draft
BBNJ Agreement, 2019a.
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The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to develop
a benefit-sharing methodology which can be used as
a tool to understand the balance of beneficial versus
burdensome aspects associated with different benefit-
sharing options. This will involve making use of a
multi-criteria analysis technique (MCA) to help decision-
makers to select options in an objective and transparent
manner (de Brucker et al, 2013). The main objective
of the MCA technique is to overcome challenges that
human decision-makers experience when handling large
amounts of complicated information in a consistent
manner (Dodgson et al, 2009). The second aim is
to demonstrate how the methodology can work by
applying it to the BBNJ context, to review the different
types of non-monetary and monetary benefit-sharing
options with potential for adoption under the new
agreement, in order to determine which forms may
provide more balanced outcomes. The BBNJ context
was selected for demonstration of the methodology
because these negotiations represent a relevant, current
opportunity which may directly benefit from such an
exercise with regards to making informed decisions in
terms of the benefit-sharing options to be adopted in the
treaty text. This objective was achieved by identifying
the key benefit-sharing factors to consider, as well as
their relative importance to stakeholders. The benefit-
sharing factors were then applied to different benefit-
sharing options through the use of the new equation, to
reveal the balance of beneficial impacts versus burden
associated with the different options.
The authors acknowledge the limited number of
interviewees involved and suggest that further inter-
views with a larger number of participants would be
needed to draw significant conclusions in the context
of ongoing BBNJ negotiations, as well as also in other
genetic resource ABS circumstances. In addition, the
authors wish to highlight the broad scope of the cur-
rent paper and general nature of the factors considered.
Future research is needed to build on the results gath-
ered in this study and to include more comprehensive
literature review as well as more detailed information
gathered from various expert groups. This would help to
consolidate the perceived balance of beneficial impacts
versus burden associated with benefit-sharing options.
Development of a Benefit-Sharing Tool
Materials and Methods
The study began with a scoping literature review to
identify benefit-sharing factors that may enable analy-
sis of the positive versus burdensome aspects of benefit-
sharing options. The benefit-sharing options which
could be considered for a potential governance (ABS)
system for MGR from ABNJ were also identified (FAO,
2001; Nagoya Protocol, 2011; World Health Organiza-
tion, 2011; BBNJ, 2019b; Collins et al, 2020). The litera-
ture review involved searches through Pubmed, Embase,
EurLex, the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the United Nations BBNJ website3, the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Nagoya
Protocol (UNCLOS, 1982; CBD, 1992; Nagoya Protocol,
2011). Search keywords included: benefit-sharing, ABS,
genetic resources, MGR, ABNJ, and capacity building.
Results
Benefit-Sharing Factors
As a result of the authors’ own experience in terms
of how benefit-sharing works in practice, specifically
the modalities of drafting and negotiating benefit-
sharing contracts, coupled with literature review, five
factors were identified as being the main objectives
and considerations of benefit-sharing associated with
utilisation of genetic resources (referred to in this paper
as ‘benefit-sharing factors’, Young and Tvedt, 2017).
Listed below and in Table 1 are descriptions of the
benefit-sharing factors considered in this study.
1. Biodiversity goals: Different goals and objec-
tives, as defined by legal biodiversity acts or
treaty’s, may be attained through benefit-sharing.
BBNJ context: relevant goals include contribut-
ing towards conservation of marine biological
diversity of ABNJ, promoting sustainable use of
MGR from ABNJ, fostering scientific R&D and
promoting fair and equitable benefit-sharing (Art
140, UNCLOS, 1982; CBD, 1992; Harden-Davies
and Gjerde, 2019; Collins et al, 2020).
2. Direct beneficiaries: The number of individuals
receiving benefits will vary according to the type
of benefit that is being shared. BBNJ context: a
greater number of individuals may have access
to MGR data if this is shared, such as via online
databases, compared to the number of people who
may receive funding to conduct PhD projects on
topics related to BBNJ.
3. Benefit-sharing significance: The impact associ-
ated with different forms of benefit-sharing could
be approximately determined in terms of the sig-
nificance, value and the duration of the impact. For
example, impacts could include enhanced employ-
ment and contribution towards scientific knowl-
edge. Duration of impacts may vary from weeks
to months or years and could give an indication
of whether future generations may be positively
influenced by the benefit-sharing or not (Harden-
Davies and Gjerde, 2019). BBNJ context: training
courses as part of capacity building initiatives may
lead to longer-term positive impacts on a group of
people, perhaps linked to enhanced employability,
than would be the case for access to MGR data.
4. Burden on the user: Users could include any
organisations or individual researchers from devel-
oped or developing states. If benefit-sharing is a
requirement, these users may encounter a degree
of burden linked to the process of sharing. This
burden may take the form of monetary cost to
3 https://www.un.org/bbnj/ - accessed 08 March 2020
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generate the so-called ‘benefits’ in the first place,
such as tailored training courses or a monetary
payment, but also the transaction cost of sharing
benefits. In addition, the generation and sharing of
benefits will involve human labour costs, for exam-
ple sending experts to beneficiary locations to con-
duct capacity-building or training initiatives. Time
may represent another burdensome aspect. Whilst
some types of benefit-sharing require only one sim-
ple transaction, other forms may require repeated
actions over time. BBNJ context: sharing of bene-
fits in the BBNJ context may involve burdens and
costs to the user, for example to set up and organ-
ise databases in which MGR data can be stored and
accessed, or sending of laboratory equipment as a
form of technology transfer.
5. Burden on the regulator: A regulator may
encounter a degree of burden linked to the
process of benefit-sharing, as well as related to
the need to build capacity in the context of novel
regulation. This may involve raising awareness
of and enforcing compliance with applicable
legislation. These burdens may be both in terms
of monetary costs and human labour costs, similar
to those described for the users above. However,
for the regulator, these costs may be linked to
monitoring and checking compliance of users with
the benefit-sharing requirements. BBNJ context:
at present, it remains unclear whether there will
be a regulator for ABNJ, or who this could
be (Mohammed, 2017; BBNJ, 2019b). However,
in the event that there is a regulator/regulatory
body charged with regulating ABS linked to MGR
from ABNJ, and benefit-sharing is a requirement,
then the regulator may face burdens associated
with overseeing the process of benefit-sharing,
particularly in terms of monetary costs, complexity
and time.
Rationale for Selecting These Five Benefit-Sharing
Factors
The reasoning behind the five factors on benefit-sharing
is threefold. The first reason relates to the concept of
establishing a balanced ABS system as referred to in
our previous research (Sirakaya, 2019, 2020). For an
ABS system to successfully establish balance between
the user and the provider (in bilateral genetic resources
frameworks), so as to fairly distribute benefits arising
from utilisation of genetic resources between the users
of genetic resources and beneficiaries, it is crucial to
ensure that such a system attends to the international
biodiversity goals. The authors here specifically explore
benefit-sharing options and therefore the factors pay
due regard to the international biodiversity goals as
identified under our current research as well as the
previous research conducted on the matter (Sirakaya,
2020).
Secondly, the five factors were selected since they
clearly define and influence the modalities of benefit-
sharing and can be negotiated when drafting agree-
ments (Young and Tvedt, 2017). The authors believe
that these factors, coupled with agreement between
users and providers, can promote an objective balance
in benefit-sharing.
Multiple stakeholder groups are involved within the
BBNJ context and it is of utmost importance that
an instrument is developed that attains the needs of
all of these groups to the greatest extent possible. A
stakeholder-driven MCA is the best available method
to achieve this (de Brucker et al, 2013) (Sirakaya and
De Brucker, personal communication). A recent study
conducted by Sirakaya and De Brucker (under review)
demonstrates how MCA can been applied to design
regulatory frameworks for access to genetic resources
in cases which involve multiple stakeholders. As such,
the third reason for the selection of the criteria refers
to the importance of stakeholder consultation under the
MCA. According to Freeman (1984), stakeholders are
defined as ‘any individual or group who can affect an
organisation’s performance or who is affected by the
achievement of this organisation’s objectives.’ Looking
into regulatory issues related to benefit-sharing in
ABNJ, taking into account Freeman’s definition, five key
stakeholder groups were identified: developing states,
developed states, civil society, the scientific research
community and the private sector (Collins et al, 2020).
Although questions remain regarding whether there will
be any form of regulatory body in the BBNJ context, this
could potentially involve members from both developing
and developed states working together to fulfill the role.
The scientific research community and private sector
represent the potential users of MGR. Developing states
and civil society are the likely beneficiary groups who
would receive benefits shared from utilisation of MGR
from ABNJ.
Stakeholders’ perceptions play a crucial role in MCA
conducted on ABS frameworks. This is due to the fact
that a balanced ABS system can only be established
if there is a reasonable ABS framework that the users
would be incentivised to adhere to. The same principle
applies to a potential benefit-sharing system for ABNJ.
The users (i.e. the scientific research community and
private sector) would only be incentivised if there is
a foreseeable balance between the impact of being a
part of the system and the burden thereof. Likewise,
the system would only function as intended if the
cost borne to the regulator (including members from
developing and developed states) of establishing and
maintaining the system is considerably lower than the
benefits generated through the system to be shared with
beneficiaries (developing states and civil society). In line
with this, Harden-Davies and Gjerde (2019) stipulate
the ‘need to strike a balance between the right to use and
the responsibility to share’. Therefore, by reviewing the
balance of potential beneficial impacts (private, social
and environmental aspects) versus burden, negotiators
may be in a better position to make informed decisions
regarding which benefit-sharing options may be most
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Table 1. Description of the five benefit-sharing factors considered in this study.
Benefit-Sharing Factors Description References
Biodiversity goals (G) i. Contributing towards conservation of marine
biological diversity of ABNJ
ii. Promoting sustainable use of MGR from ABNJ
iii. Fostering scientific R&D
iv. Promoting fair and equitable benefit-sharing
v. Inclusivity of developing states in access to and
utilisation of MGR of ABNJ





Direct beneficiaries (#) i. Number of individuals impacted/receiving the
benefits
Morgera (2014)
Benefit-sharing significance (S) Size of impact, for example:
i. Duration (months or years – gives an indication of
whether the impact will be beneficial to current and
future generations)




Burden on the users of (M)GR (U) i. Monetary cost and human labour to generate and










Pisupati and Bavikatte (2014)
appropriate to consider including as part of a new
benefit-sharing framework for ABNJ.
In sum, these five benefit-sharing factors are crucial
in establishing a balanced benefit-sharing framework
for ABNJ with governance options that attain interna-
tional biodiversity objectives, as outlined by legal acts
and treaty’s, and pay due regard to stakeholder prefer-
ences (Collins et al, 2020).
Benefit-Sharing Balance
In order to objectively evaluate different benefit-
sharing options in terms of the ratio of potential
positive impacts versus associated burden in a fair and
consistent manner, an equation was proposed, taking
into consideration the five benefit-sharing factors (see
Figure 1). Weighted values were used in this study to
incorporate consideration of the fact that some benefit-
sharing factors may be perceived as more important
than other factors and should therefore contribute more
to the final score. Different methods can be used to
generate the weighting values for different factors.
For example, an analytic hierarchy process, case-based
reasoning, simple multi-attribute rating technique,
mathematical programming or interview approaches
could be used (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986; Ho
et al, 2010; Nerini et al, 2014). In this study, the values of
weightings were obtained through an interview process.
Benefit-sharing factors (G, #, S, U, R) were first each
multiplied by an average weighting (a-e) assigned to
each factor by interviewees. The three positive, weighted
benefit-sharing factor scores are multiplied together, as
are the two burdensome, weighted factor scores. The
positive aspects are then divided by the burdensome
aspects to give a benefit-sharing balance value for each
benefit-sharing option.
Applying the Benefit-Sharing Tool to the
BBNJ Context
Materials and Methods
After development of the benefit-sharing methodology
(see Figure 1), a semi-structured, qualitative interview
was prepared (see Supplemental File 1). Interviews
were conducted with ten experts. Availability and
willingness to participate in the interview repre-
sented a controlling factor in the recruitment of
participants, as well as the variety of stakeholder
groups, and contributed to the limited numbers.
Figure 1. Equation to determine the balance of potential
positive impact versus burden associated with different forms
of benefit-sharing. Letters a-e represent the average weight
assigned by interviewees to the five benefit-sharing factors.
Benefit-sharing factors: G= biodiversity goals; # = direct
beneficiaries; S = benefit-sharing significance; U = burden on
the user, and; R = burden on the regulator.
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Figure 2. Average weight assigned by interviewees to the five
different benefit-sharing factors considered. Error bars indicate
standard deviation of the mean.
These experts are based in different locations around
the world (four from developing and six from
developed states) and representative of different
stakeholder groups: two from the scientific research
community (one from a developed and one from
a developing state), three from developing states
delegations, three from developed states delegations,
and two from civil society (both from developed
states). Whilst effort was made to include private
sector stakeholders in the interview process, and indeed
representatives from one organisation did provide
helpful feedback on some of the questions, time
constraints and availability of representatives rendered
this not possible in the scope of the current study.
Interviews were conducted during the third session of
the intergovernmental conference (IGC3) for BBNJ in
New York (between 19-28 August 2019).
The interviews followed a pre-defined guide list of
questions (see Supplemental File 1), which started
by requesting participants to rank five benefit-sharing
factors (see Table 1) on a scale from 1 to 5 in
terms of perceived relative importance (see Figure 2).
Participants were then asked to score a variety of non-
monetary and monetary benefit-sharing options in terms
of potential impact of these on the five benefit-sharing
factors (from 0 = no impact, to 5 = very high impact),
according to their perspective, and to give short reasons
for their decisions. These scores were used to perform
a MCA, whereby scores were multiplied by the average
weighting assigned to each factor and inserted into an
equation (see Figure 1), to determine the balance of
potential positive impact versus burden associated with
each different form of benefit-sharing (see Figure 3
and Figure 4). This enabled comparison of the ratio
of potential positive impacts versus burden between
different benefit-sharing options, taking into account the
relative importance of different key factors. Interviews
were audio-recorded and transcribed. Microsoft Excel
software was used as a means to store the data. A
thematic analysis of the transcripts was conducted to
identify common themes in responses. All data were
anonymised by grouping results into stakeholder groups.
Written informed consent forms were signed by all of the
interviewees in this study.
Results
Weighting the Benefit-Sharing Factors
According to the average stakeholder ranking, biodiver-
sity goals were considered as the most important factor
to be taken into consideration when assessing how bal-
anced different benefit-sharing options are. The other
four benefit-sharing factors were considered approxi-
mately equal in terms of importance (see Figure 2). The
range of ranking given by interviewees was greatest for
the direct beneficiaries factor, as indicated by the larger
error bar in Figure 2. Reasons given by interviewees for
these rankings are described below.
Biodiversity Goals. The majority of interviewees stated
that the biodiversity goals are the most critical factor
from their perspective. Whilst many different goals
could fall under this category, interviewees most
frequently referred to conservation of biodiversity as the
aspect that they consider most important. This is because
the goals of ‘conservation and sustainable use of marine
biological diversity’ are the key overarching goals of the
new agreement as a whole (BBNJ, 2019b). Collins et al
(2020) present further detailed information regarding
stakeholder goals for a potential new ABS mechanism
for ABNJ. Other goals, such as promoting marine
scientific research, are viewed as necessary to achieve
the conservation objectives. They also indicated that
biodiversity goals are more important than any of the
other four benefit-sharing factors considered in this
study. One interviewee noted that biodiversity goals are
important for all stakeholders involved, not just for the
beneficiaries of benefit-sharing.
Direct Beneficiaries. Most interviewees indicated the
benefits should be shared amongst as many people
as possible, and that the greater the number of
people who are positively affected the better. However,
three interviewees also noted that the importance of
beneficiaries depends on the definitions, whether it is
only the people who are directly affected, or also those
who indirectly benefit. Sometimes only a few people
may immediately and directly benefit from a benefit-
sharing initiative, such as collaborative or joint venture
projects, but such an effort may indirectly have a large
impact on many more people and other factors, perhaps
over time. For example, sharing of MGR samples and
data for scientific research may only initially affect a
moderately low number of people, but if this leads to
development of new pharmaceutical products to treat
human illness or to maintaining the health of the
ocean through conservation measures, then a far larger
number of beneficiaries will be encountered.
Benefit-Sharing Significance. The majority of intervie-
wees assigned this factor a moderately high score. Two
interviewees stated that the duration of benefit-sharing
significance is vital. However, two other interviewees
gave this a moderately low score and suggested that,
from their perspective and in the current context, this
factor was not as important as the others considered in
this study.
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Figure 3. A) Average weighted scores for the seven non-
monetary benefit-sharing options according to the five benefit-
sharing factors, and B) scores according the benefit-sharing
balance equation for the seven non-monetary benefit-sharing
options.
Burden on the Users of (M)GR. Burden on the user
was considered moderately important by over half
of interview participants. One interviewee raised the
question of whether there might be the possibility to
charge a ‘handling fee’ for certain types of benefits (such
as sharing of material). The degree of burden on the user
may be affected by whether there is the possibility to
charge a handling fee (or similar) to disseminate MGR
samples and other benefits. It was suggested that sharing
of benefits cannot all be for free.
Burden on the Regulator. The majority of interviewees
assigned this factor a high score. Whilst it remains
unclear whether there might be or who might constitute
the regulatory authority in the BBNJ context, it is
possible that such an institution will be established.
Interviewees acknowledged that this is an important
factor because if burden on the regulator is not taken
into careful consideration, then the whole benefit-
sharing system, whether non-monetary or monetary,
could fail. For example, if the system is overly expensive,
then any potential monetary benefits may be used to
fund running of the system itself rather than accruing
for the benefit of beneficiaries (Morgera and Tsioumani,
2010; Morgera, 2014; Tsioumani, 2018). In addition,
burden on the regulator could result in lengthy decision-
making processes, thereby indirectly affecting potential
users.
Non-Monetary Benefit-Sharing Options
To gather perspectives on benefit-sharing, interviewees
were asked to consider the potential influence of
different benefit-sharing options on the five benefit-
sharing factors (Table 1). Analysis of the President’s aid
to negotiations (2019) and a review of the literature
lead to identification of seven non-monetary benefit-
sharing options which could be considered in the context
of governing the utilisation of MGR from ABNJ (see
Figure 3). A description of the options considered in this
study, and their significance, can be found in Sirakaya
(2019) and Collins et al (2020). Non-monetary benefit-
sharing options considered here include:
1. Sharing of Raw Data:
(a) Metadata;
(b) Genetic Sequence Data (GSD)4,5,6
(c) Biochemical Information
2. Sharing of Research Results
3. Capacity Building
4. Technology Transfer
5. Research Directed Towards Priority Needs
The benefit-sharing balance, as calculated using the
equation described above, indicated the most favourable
balance of beneficial impacts versus burden associated
with sharing of GSD and sharing of research results.
Sharing of biochemical information, metadata and
capacity building received a similar, but slightly lower
score. Technology transfer, and in particular research
directed towards priority needs, received less favourable
balances (see Figure 3B). Reasons given by interviewees
for potential positive impacts versus burden associated
with different non-monetary benefit-sharing options are
described below.
Sharing of Raw Data (Metadata, GSD and Biochemi-
cal Information). For some participants, all three types
of raw data sharing are viewed together as a package. It
was suggested that if raw data were to be made publicly
available online, this could have a positive impact on a
relatively large number of beneficiaries (Figure 3A). This
is because many people would then be able to access the
data easily, quickly and possibly for free. However, two
interviewees also acknowledged that many people, par-
ticularly in developing states, may not be able to make
use of the raw data since they lack the capacity to work
on it. As such, unless accompanied by capacity building,
the number of beneficiaries impacted by sharing of raw
data may not actually be very high.
Interviewees suggested that sharing of raw data may
not immediately have a large effect on the number of
4 GSD is the term most commonly used in the BBNJ context to
refer to data/information which is described as Digital Sequence
Information (DSI) under the auspices of the CBD. According to the
Consortium of European Taxonomic Facilities (CETAF) and the Society
for the Preservation of Natural History Collections (SPHNC), the term
GSD is in line with the concept of DSI. However, despite efforts to
define DSI/GSD, there is currently no official, internationally accepted
definition of the term.
5 https://www.cbd.int/abs/DSI-views/2019/CETAF-DSI.pdf -
accessed 09 March 2020
6 https://www.cbd.int/abs/DSI-views/2019/SPNHC-DSI.pdf -
accessed 09 March 2020
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direct beneficiaries, the biodiversity goals or benefit-
sharing significance. However, by building up large data
sets, the beneficial impact of sharing raw data on these
benefit-sharing factors may grow and could become
relatively high over time. This could also be in part due
to the long-lived nature of data; once data is curated
and stored, it can be made available and accessed for a
very long time. One interviewee suggested that sharing
of raw data could be one of the best things we could
do to have a positive influence on the benefit-sharing
significance.
One interviewee explained that a lot more work
is required to generate biochemical information than
for generation of metadata and GSD, because the
process is comparably less straightforward. In addition,
one interviewee suggested that whilst it is already
best practice to share metadata and GSD, they were
unsure whether it is yet best practice to share all
biochemical information. Therefore, the burden on the
user associated with sharing of biochemical information,
in terms of opportunity cost, may be higher than that
associated with the other forms of raw data sharing. In
addition, the burden on the users related to sharing of
data may depend on the stakeholder group in question
and the type of data that is required to be shared.
For some users, such as those in the private sector,
this is likely to be very burdensome and possibly even
a deterrent, particularly if mandatory and involves
the obligation to share commercially important data.
This is because mandatory sharing of raw data would
likely change the incentive to invest. Scientists in the
private sector routinely conduct novel scientific research
and publish results in scientific journals. They also
disclose scientific information in the form of patents.
However, from a commercial viewpoint, if sharing of
data beyond current practice is mandatory, this may
have broad implications for protection of intellectual
property (IP) and for maintaining competitive market
advantage. As such, mandatory sharing of valuable data
may disincentivise investments in private sector projects
involving MGR from ABNJ.
Interviewees indicated that the level of burden on the
users and on the regulators would depend on the way
in which benefit-sharing is done. Under the assumption
that a new system is developed and must be used to
share benefits, for example sharing of GSD through a
clearing house mechanism or other form of database,
this could lead to significant burden on the users and
regulators. One interviewee noted that in the draft
treaty text (BBNJ, 2019a), reference is made to a new
system whereby benefits will need to be shared through
a clearing house7 and raises the question of timing.
7 ‘Samples, data and related information shall be made available
in open access [through the clearing-house mechanism [upon
access] [after [. . . ] years]]’ and ‘States Parties shall publish and
communicate the reports of the results of the assessments in
accordance with [articles 204 to 206] [article 205] of the Convention
[, including through the clearing-house mechanism]’ (President’s aid
to negotiations, 2019).
According to the interviewee, the issue of when and how
benefits will be shared could have huge impacts on the
degree of burden experienced. If benefit-sharing is left
according to current practices, particularly in terms of
where raw data are stored, then this could have very
little or even zero impact on the burden felt by users
or the new regulator. However, if we proceed with a
new system, requiring a change in the way that data
are shared, burden may be encountered by users in
terms of requiring conversion of data into a particular
format to fit into a specific database. As such, if benefit-
sharing were to become mandatory and involves new
requirements and procedures, the burden on the users
will be higher than at present.
The burden on the regulator could be relatively
straightforward, if all they have to do is verify that
data is being shared with a database, but the degree
of burden will depend on how much information they
need. One interviewee also noted that it may be
important to consider the burden on the beneficiaries
accepting raw data. This may involve requirements to
develop infrastructure to receive and make use of data.
Sharing of Research Results. Interviewees indicated
that a relatively large number of beneficiaries could be
impacted by the sharing of research results (Figure 3A).
However, one interviewee suggested that research
results, such as a research paper, may be read by fewer
people compared to the number of people who could
access or use raw MGR data.
Sharing of research results could have a large positive
effect on the overall impact of benefit-sharing, and also
on the biodiversity goals such as conservation. It was
suggested that this could be partly due to the long-lived
nature of research results.
Interviewees suggested that the impact of sharing
research results on the burden experienced by users
would be moderate, since writing of research articles
inherently involves a degree of human labour costs.
However, it was also noted that this could be less
burdensome for users than sharing of raw data, because
this would involve a different system which may remain
more similar to current practice. It was suggested that
the burden on the regulator may also be moderate,
but would depend on whether this was mandatory or
voluntary. If the regulator was required to track that
sharing of research results has been done, then this
could lead to quite a heavy burden.
Capacity Building. It was suggested that the influence
of capacity building on biodiversity goals and signifi-
cance would depend on how sustainable the capacity
building initiatives are. For example, if scientists are
trained as part of a capacity building effort and then
decide to leave the country, this cannot be considered as
sustainable. According to one interviewee, this is unfor-
tunately the case when reviewing current capacity build-
ing activity, and represents a challenge faced in many
developing countries. The key question here is how to
ensure the sustainability of capacity building. In an ideal
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world capacity building would be sustainable, so that
effects are long-lasting.
The burden on the users of MGR may be greater
in association with capacity building than some of the
other options (Figure 3A). This is because it requires
a combination of time, money and specific expertise to
execute such an initiative.
Technology Transfer. It was suggested that the number
of beneficiaries who could benefit from technology
transfer would be moderately low. It was proposed
that this may be because only a few people will be
able to make use of the technology, particularly if
the technology is very sophisticated and the absorptive
capacity is low. One interviewee suggested that the
impact of technology transfer on the biodiversity goals
will be less than that associated with other benefit-
sharing options (Figure 3A). As with capacity building,
the influence of technology transfer on the benefit-
sharing significance will depend on the sustainability.
Interviewees were of the opinion that technology
transfer may have an impact for a short amount of time,
but were uncertain whether this would have long-lasting
effects.
The burden on the users related to technology
transfer may depend on the stakeholder group in
question, the type of technology that is required to be
shared, who pays for the transfer of technology and the
means by which this is done. It was suggested that for
some users, such as the scientific research community,
this may be less burdensome than sharing of raw data.
However, for other uses, such as those in the private
sector, this is likely to be very burdensome, particularly
if mandatory. This is because investors in the private
sector aim to recoup investments, and mandatory, free
transfer of technology would possibly discourage further
investment. Alternatively, one interviewee suggested
that if technology transfer were to be conducted on
commercial terms, this could represent less burden for
the private sector.
Research Directed Towards Priority Needs. One
interviewee stated that, although research directed
towards priority needs has the potential to reach a
lot of people and could have a very high impact
on attending to the biodiversity goals, particularly
contributing towards conservation and sustainable use,
they simply did not think that it was going to happen.
This is because the interviewee felt that such a system of
focusing research on priority needs would be unfeasible
and unworkable. As such, the anticipated number of
beneficiaries and influence on biodiversity goals and
significance was scored relatively low (Figure 3A). In
addition, it was noted that the impact of research
directed towards priority needs on the benefit-sharing
factors would depend on what exactly the priority needs
are.
The burden on the user was thought to be moderately
high, unless the users are already conducting research
in the priority needs area. One interviewee suggested
that such priority needs could be linked to research
with socially beneficial uses, including ‘health and food
security’ as described in Article 8 of the Nagoya Protocol
(2011). This is because forcing scientists to change
their research from one field of work to a different
one, associated with the identified priority needs, would
require significant monetary costs. Similarly, the burden
on the regulator would likely also be high. It was
suggested that the regulator may experience burden
associated with understanding who the developing
states are, identifying their priority needs and deciding
how this should be regulated. One interviewee noted
that it would likely be very difficult for a regulator to
monitor this, and could be very challenging if it involves
a new system in which to direct their regulation towards
this specific purpose.
Monetary Benefit-Sharing Options
Analysis of the President’s aid to negotiations (2019)
and a review of the literature lead to identification
of eight monetary benefit-sharing options which could
be considered in the BBNJ context (see Figure 4). A
description of the options considered in this study, and
why they might be important, can be found in Sirakaya
(2019) and Collins et al (2020). Monetary benefit-









Interviewees were asked to consider the potential impact
of different monetary benefit-sharing options on the five
benefit-sharing factors. According the benefit-sharing
balance calculation, the most favourable monetary
benefit-sharing option, in terms of balancing beneficial
impacts versus burden, was research funding followed
closely by salaries (see Figure 4B). Joint ventures
were considered the next most favourable option,
followed by joint IP rights. Access fee, milestone
payments, license fee and royalties were viewed as
similar in terms of balancing the potential positive im-
pacts versus burden. Reasons given by interviewees
for potential positive impacts versus burden associated
with different monetary benefit-sharing options are de-
scribed below.
Interviewees noted that their answers in this section
were given under the assumption that commercialisa-
tion of MGR is successful and that there will be money
to share. This is crucial, because four interviewees out of
the ten indicated that they do not believe that there will
be any financial profits derived from R&D on MGR, and
therefore no money to share.
8 In this paper, the term ‘joint ventures’ is used in a general, broad
sense to describe a collaborative project/initiative undertaken jointly
by two or more entities which otherwise retain their distinct identities.
The term is not used here in the corporate or legal manner.
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Figure 4. A) Average weighted scores for the eight monetary
benefit-sharing options according to the five benefit-sharing
factors, and B) scores according to the benefit-sharing balance
equation for the eight monetary benefit-sharing options.
Research Funding and Salaries. Five of the ten
interviewees indicated that they view research funding
and salaries as similar in terms of the potential
positive impacts versus burden. Interviewees indicated
that research funding and salaries could have a
greater positive influence on the biodiversity goals and
benefit-sharing significance than the other forms of
monetary benefit-sharing, and may have more long-
term positive effects (see Figure 4A). For example,
research funding could help to build capacity in
developing states, potentially contributing towards
enhanced employability, and could also be directly
focused on long-term conservation and sustainable use
of biodiversity.
One interviewee noted that the level of burden on
the user associated with research funding and salaries
would depend on who is paying for it. The burden
on the users would be low if this is to be paid by
the regulator, and the burden on the regulator may be
relatively high. However, vice versa may be true if the
users are required to pay this. It was also suggested
that since research funding is something that is already
done by the scientific community, then the burden on the
regulator would likely be less for research funding than
other monetary benefit-sharing options, if the regulator
is only required to make sure that the money has been
channeled appropriately.
Joint Ventures. Most interviewees agreed that joint
ventures would influence a relatively low number of
beneficiaries (Figure 4A). One participant stated that
joint ventures will require money which cannot be
shared amongst many people, and therefore the number
of people affected will likely be low. The influence of
joint ventures on the biodiversity goals and significance
was also thought to be low, and would likely depend on
the conditions.
It was suggested that the level of burden experienced
by the user and the regulator would be moderate, but
could be low if joint ventures were considered on a
voluntary rather than a mandatory basis. This is because
if joint ventures were required on a mandatory basis,
then perhaps users/ organisations who are not equipped
with the appropriate capacity would struggle to establish
such projects.
Joint IP Rights. The majority of interviewees felt that
joint IP rights (IPR) would impact a low number of
beneficiaries (Figure 4A). One interviewee suggested
that perhaps it was possible for this number to grow
over time. Participants were also of the view that the
influence of joint IPR on biodiversity goals and benefit-
sharing significance would be low, possibly with no long-
term positive effects. With regards to burden on the user,
interviewees suggested that this would depend on the
conditions associated with the joint IPR, but was likely
to be moderate to high. The burden on the regulator
is likely to be high, and participants noted that they
were unsure how this form of benefit-sharing could be
regulated.
One interviewee indicated that they did not see joint
IPR as a feasible option, as it would either not be
relevant or appropriate in most cases. The interviewee
stated that only inventors or co-inventors can claim IPR
and requesting joint ownership with entities who do not
represent this would lead to an inability to fulfill the
required criteria to claim IPR. The only situation where
such an approach has been considered previously is in
the context of traditional knowledge, where indigenous
knowledge may be included in an invention. However,
according the interviewee, even then there are much
better approaches to follow than joint IPR in order to
share benefits. Nonetheless, if scientists from developing
countries are included in a research project and at
some point in time a new invention is developed, then
joint IPR could be appropriate. It was also noted that
publications have copyrights involved, which could also
be considered as a form of joint IPR if multiple co-
authors are involved in the effort. As such, the feasibility
of these options will depend on the details regarding
how this is done.
Milestone Payments, License Fee and Royalties.
Most interviewees considered that milestone payments,
license fees and royalties would lead to similar impacts
on the benefit-sharing factors (see Figure 4A). One
reason given for this is that people find it very difficult to
distinguish between the three. It was suggested that the
milestone payments could have similar positive impacts
on the benefit-sharing factors as an access fee (see
below). As with the access fee, questions were raised
regarding whether users of MGR would be able to pay
the milestone payments, license fees or royalties. One
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interviewee stated that they did not believe that a license
fee would actually be workable.
Interviewees indicated that license fees and royalties
may be more burdensome on the user and regulator
than the milestone payments, but that all three would
likely be more burdensome than an access fee. This is
because the access fee could take the form of a one-off
payment (with no subsequent costs), of a preset and
limited amount, whereas the others may incur more
than one fee and may be payable at times which are less
clearly defined than at the point of access (Collins et al,
2020).
Access Fee. The majority of interviewees were of the
opinion that an access fee would impact only a low
number of beneficiaries (Figure 4A). It was suggested
that this may be in part because relatively little money
would be generated and few users would be able
to pay this if it was expensive, although research
institutions could potentially seek scholarships to cover
this (see Collins et al, 2020) for more detail). Questions
were raised regarding to whom this fee would be paid.
The influence of an access fee on the biodiversity
goals and significance was also considered low. One
interviewee noted that the influence would depend what
this fee is used for, but was sceptical that it would have
a positive effect on these factors. Another interviewee
stated that an access fee system could be attractive
because it would ensure that some income is generated
when MGR are collected from the high seas which could
be channelled into benefit-sharing. However, the same
person also acknowledged that they did not think an
access fee would be feasible, because it would inflict
on the ‘Freedom of the High Seas’ principle. Therefore,
from a negotiation point of view, this would likely be
very difficult to implement.
Discussion
A Benefit-Sharing Tool
Development of a Benefit-Sharing Methodology
Benefit-sharing in the context of existing genetic
resource frameworks under the Nagoya Protocol (con-
ducted in a bilateral manner) is often considered to
lack transparency, clarity and accountability, particularly
for monetary benefit-sharing options (Fedder, 2013;
Pauchard, 2017; Ruiz-Muller, 2018). For example, when
dealing with ABS under the Nagoya Protocol, and since
ABS contracts are private and users are not obliged to
report what is in the contract, governments do not have
access to information regarding the amount of money
that flows out as a result of ABS. Making use of a
methodology, such as that described in this study, could
help to achieve a more favourable balance by negating
the issue of transparency, by clarifying the key factors
and helping negotiators to make informed decisions. In
addition, lessons learnt from the ITPGRFA in terms of
aspects to consider as part of an operating, multilateral
ABS system may also be useful here (Louafi, 2013; Stan-
nard and Moeller, 2013; Tsioumani, 2018). Ultimately,
use of this tool could help to enhance understanding
and implementation of benefit-sharing policies/ legisla-
tion with greater potential to balance beneficial impacts
with associated burden, thereby enhancing workability
of the ABS system as a whole. However, challenges with
the methodology have been identified during application
in this study (as described in the section below) which
should be addressed in order to develop a more robust
tool for application in a variety of benefit-sharing con-
texts.
Lessons Learnt from Application of the Methodology
to the BBNJ Context
Accurately determining the influence of different
benefit-sharing options on benefit-sharing factors, such
as the significance, are difficult to measure. Indeed,
interviewees found it challenging to give scores for
some options, partly because participants may not have
fully understood or known how to measure and give an
accurate answer. This is a clear aspect of the tool which
could be improved in the future through consultation
with a greater number of experts on that particular
aspect. In addition, given the fact that these questions
were asked in the context of ongoing negotiations, it
is expected that some participants will have responded
with strategic rather than objective answers. This may
be the reason why a small minority of interviewees indi-
cated that salaries as a form of monetary benefit-sharing
would have a large positive influence on benefit-sharing
factors, whilst the authors expected the impact to be
moderately low compared to other options. In addition,
the authors do not suggest that results collected in this
study represent a comprehensive review of stakeholder
perspectives on this subject matter. Further interviews
with a much larger number of participants would be
needed to draw significant conclusion for the BBNJ con-
text. However, it is suggested that the benefit-sharing
equation described in this article provides a useful tool
and starting point, which can be built upon by decision
makers in the future, to include more detailed informa-
tion gathered from various expert groups, such as likely
impacts on potential beneficiaries, to consolidate the
perceived balance of beneficial impacts versus burden.
In addition, the equation can be tailored according to
different policy settings where different benefit-sharing
factors and additional nuance may be more appropriate.
Benefit-Sharing in the BBNJ Context
Benefit-Sharing Factors
The most important benefit-sharing factor, according
to average weights allocated by interviewees (see
Figure 1), was the influence on biodiversity goals. This
is likely because these goals, in particular conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity, are the primary
objective of existing genetic resource frameworks, such
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as the Nagoya Protocol9 and the Plant Treaty, and as
such set the precedence for similar frameworks in the
future (CBD, 1992; FAO, 2001; Nagoya Protocol, 2011;
World Health Organization, 2011; BBNJ, 2019a). In the
BBNJ context, it has already been suggested that fair and
equitable benefit-sharing related to MGR from ABNJ can
enable the international community to address global
challenges (Morgera, 2018a). These global challenges
may be related to environmental protection, social
objectives and private economic goals (de Brucker
et al, 2013; Mohammed, 2017; Morgera, 2018a). The
particular goals of greatest importance to stakeholders
are different in the BBNJ context compared to areas
within national jurisdiction, where aspects such as legal
certainty are considered most vital (Collins et al, 2020;
Sirakaya, 2020). Legal certainty is perceived to be of
particularly high importance for private sector users
of genetic resources (in order to promote investment),
who at present appear to view genetic resources in
areas within national jurisdiction as more relevant to
them than MGR in ABNJ (Sirakaya, 2019; Collins et al,
2020). As such, the benefit-sharing factors involved in
the methodology, and the weighting assigned to each,
are likely to vary according to the circumstances.
Non-Monetary Benefit-Sharing Options and Balance
of Potential Positive Aspects vs Burden
Interviewee results indicate that sharing of GSD and
research results provide the most favourable balance in
terms of beneficial impacts versus burden. Technology
transfer, and in particular research directed towards
priority needs, received less favourable balances (see
Figure 3). It has been noted by the Ad Hoc Technical
Expert Group on DSI on Genetic Resources under
the CBD10 that DSI ‘plays an important role in
deepening knowledge about biodiversity, identifying and
mitigating risks to threatened species, enhancing our
ability to track illegal trade, identifying species and
the geographic origins of products, and assisting with
biodiversity planning and conservation management’.
As such, the sharing of this type of information in
the context of BBNJ is likely to have a positive
influence on the biodiversity goals, in particular the
conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ. Sharing
of GSD appears to be a relatively straightforward
procedure, and it is considered best practice amongst
the scientific research community (Devi and Pisupati,
2018). Under the assumption that the BBNJ agreement
describes requirements to share GSD in keeping with
current practices, through the same current channels
(and not through other systems), then this form of
benefit-sharing may not incur additional burden on the
users of MGR. However, the authors acknowledge the
9 For example, according to Article 9 of the Nagoya Protocol (2011),
‘The Parties shall encourage users and providers to direct benefits arising
from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conservation of
biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components’.
10 https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/079f/2dc5/2d20217d1cdacac787524d
8e/dsi-ahteg-2018-01-03-en.pdf - accessed 09 March 2020
contentious nature of discussions regarding GSD/DSI in
multiple fora, including the CBD and the Plant Treaty.
Whilst sharing of GSD/DSI itself may be relatively
uncontroversial, the potential requirement for monetary
benefit-sharing associated with utilisation of GSD/DSI
is highly contentious (Kobayashi, 2019). Sharing of
research results is thought to have a similar positive
effect to the sharing of GSD on enhancing the potential
for conservation of marine biodiversity, by helping to
build an enabling environment in which MSR can
flourish (Harden-Davies and Gjerde, 2019).
Technology transfer represented a relatively
unfavourable balance. This may be associated with
a combination of relatively high expected burden on
the users of genetic resources and on the regulators,
together with limited potential beneficial impacts. The
potential burdens on different stakeholder groups asso-
ciated with technology transfer are described in Collins
et al (2020). It is suggested that the degree of bur-
den, in terms of financial cost and administration, will
depend on the type of technology, the conditions, how
it is funded and how the transfer is managed, but on
the whole, these will be more significant than for other
forms of non-monetary benefit-sharing. For example,
it is generally expected that the funding required for
technology transfer will be greater than for other non-
monetary benefit-sharing options (Collins et al, 2020).
In addition, the owners of technology are often pri-
vate companies or individuals (Prip et al, 2015). As
such, transfer of this technology will need to involve
consideration of commercial aspects, such as the inher-
ent requirement for private sector entities to generate
a return on investment and maintain market com-
petitiveness. Related factors will include appropriate
intellectual property arrangements and/ or private eco-
nomic incentives or public funding, particularly in the
circumstance of private ownership of technology (Prip
et al, 2015). Moreover, the beneficial impacts linked
to technology transfer may be limited by absorptive
capacity (or enabling factors) in the recipient state.
According to Prip et al (2015), successful technology
transfer depends on three factors: the existence of rel-
evant technology to address particular (environmental)
challenges, the relevant dissemination of technology in
a manner which makes it available to entities which
need this, and the application of technology in a manner
which is conducive to solving the challenges in mind.
As noted by interviewees involved in a study con-
ducted by Sirakaya (2019), research directed towards
priority needs would involve a degree of burden associ-
ated with making sure that the research precisely ben-
efits the provider country (or in the context of BBNJ,
the beneficiary state(s)), because this would require
a considerable amount of time, effort and resources.
This potential burden is likely to contribute to the less
favourable balance for research directed towards prior-
ity needs.
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Monetary Benefit-Sharing Options and Balance of
Potential Positive Aspects vs Burden
According to interviewee results, research funding,
followed closely by salaries, were selected as the
monetary benefit-sharing options which provide the
most favourable balance regarding beneficial impacts
versus burden. Access fees, milestone payments, license
fees and royalties received less favourable balances (see
Figure 4).
The favourable benefit-sharing balance indicated for
research funding and salaries may be because there is
a greater degree of perceived transparency involved in
these approaches, compared to other forms of mon-
etary benefit-sharing, in terms of where the financial
resources are directed and how ‘beneficial’ this could
be (Altman and Simera, 2010). This transparency with
regards to research funding is promoted by funding
organisations11,12, science foundations13, journals and
international initiatives, such as the EQUATOR (Enhanc-
ing the QUAlity and Transparency Of health Research)
network, which aim to encourage transparent reporting
of research, research funding processes and the use of
reporting guidelines14. In addition, salaries and in par-
ticular research funding can directly support R&D on
MGR, with potential to enhance conservation and sus-
tainable use of BBNJ.
The less favourable balance indicated for access
fees, milestone payments, license fees and royalties
may, therefore, be associated with a lack of clarity
and transparency in terms of how financial resources
are used and how much of a beneficial impact
this might have (Altman and Simera, 2010). Indeed,
interviewees involved in this study raised questions
and uncertainty regarding how money could be utilised
in the scope of monetary benefit-sharing options to
promote biodiversity goals, such as conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity. This uncertainty may also
be due to the complicated nature of the factors explored.
Further research, building on the current study, should
be more specific in nature and would likely be simpler
for interviewees to respond to, yielding increasingly
insightful results. For example, it was suggested that
the balance for monetary benefit-sharing options could
be more favourable than currently perceived if money
could clearly be linked to supporting these goals. Whilst
some monetary benefit-sharing options may at some
stage create incentives for biodiversity conservation,
this would depend on how and where financial
resources are allocated. This is currently not as clear
or as transparent as processes associated with research
funding and salaries (Altman and Simera, 2010). In
addition, the potential impact of benefit-sharing options
11 https://www.nihr.ac.uk/blog/how-do-you-make-research-funding-
transparent-and-fair/10991 - accessed 02 March 2020
12 https://www.ukri.org/about-us/policies-and-standards/transparen
cy/ - accessed 09 March 2020
13 https://www.nsf.gov/od/transparency/transparency.jsp - accessed
21 March 2020
14 https://www.equator-network.org/- accessed 09 March 2020
on bioidiversity goals and the overall benefit-sharing
balance may be affected by the approach and language
adopted in the new agreement. For example, the Nagoya
Protocol (2011) text refers mostly to ‘encouraging’
the flow of benefits towards biodiversity conservation,
but there is no clear obligation15. The Benefit-Sharing
Fund of the Plant Treaty provides a different example,
whereby the Contracting Parties decide for themselves
the contributions that they will make (Tsioumani,
2018). In order to reach a more favourable balance,
it will be necessary to include language in the BBNJ
agreement which clearly ties benefit-sharing options to
the objectives. This is an important point which should
be kept in mind during the negotiation process.
In this study, the authors investigated benefit-sharing
options in the manner in which they are currently
being addressed in accordance with existing ABS
frameworks under the Nagoya Protocol, Plant Treaty
and in the draft BBNJ text. When investigating details
regarding monetary benefit-sharing options with a
view to developing a methodology to balance these
with various factors, it became apparent that these
options are pooled together under the ‘monetary benefit-
sharing’ term without making the distinction between
those which accumulate (such as royalties, access fees
and milestone payments) and those which distribute
funding (such as research funding and salaries). Given
that monetary benefit-sharing is already a contentious
item in the realm of benefit-sharing, the fact that it is
dealt with in this confusing manner is not useful and
could prove problematic when translated into practice.
This point represents an important finding in the present
study. Whilst out of scope of this paper, further research
should be conducted in the future to adjust and tailor
the formula according to whether the monetary benefit-
sharing options generate or distribute funding.
A further factor which might contribute towards
the less favourable balance of monetary benefit-sharing
options compared to the non-monetary options is the
fact that the benefits will need to be shared amongst
large numbers of beneficiaries. Whilst sharing of data
or information with many people does not dilute
or divide the benefits received by each individual/
entity (each can receive the same package of data/
information), the sharing of monetary benefits amongst
many beneficiaries will likely result in limited and
small amounts of money reaching the beneficiaries.
This aspect may contribute towards the perception
held by many delegates that non-monetary benefit-
sharing could represent more predictable and more
significant options than forms of monetary benefit-
sharing (Morgera, 2018b). By focusing on goals and
identified capacity requirements, non-monetary benefit-
sharing can have a more immediate and tangible impact
15 Article 9, Nagoya Protocol, 2011: ‘The Parties shall encourage
users and providers to direct benefits arising from the utilization of
genetic resources towards the conservation of biological diversity and the
sustainable use of its components.’
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on bridging the equity gaps related to R&D on MGR.
This approach has been considered the principal success
of the Plant Treaty (Stannard and Moeller, 2013;
Tsioumani, 2018).
Conclusion
To date, benefit-sharing related to the utilisation of
genetic resources has not been as effective as was
hoped (Ruiz-Muller, 2018; Pauchard, 2017). This is at
least partially related to the lack of focus associated with
benefit-sharing options on conservation and sustainable
use of biodiversity, possible hampering of scientific
research as well as the burden placed on the regulator
and users of genetic resources. This has in some cases
led to a loss of incentive to conduct R&D on genetic
resources, with potential to further limit conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity (Tvedt, 2013). The
authors acknowledge that there are many other political
and legal issues, in addition to the technical aspects
referred to in this study, which contribute towards the
challenges currently experienced with existing benefit-
sharing systems. These issues include, for example, the
lack of objectivity in terms of approaches to agreeing
appropriate benefit-sharing measures.
A tool, such as the methodology presented in this
study (Figure 1), provides a useful means to assess
the balance of different benefit-sharing options in terms
of the potential beneficial and burdensome impacts,
taking into account the varying relative importance of
different factors. This would help policy-makers in the
future when deciding which forms of benefit-sharing
may be most appropriate to adopt, or when improving
existing ABS measures, with greater potential for
meeting proposed objectives, such as conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity. Use of this methodology
would also likely promote transparency, objectivity,
clarity and workability of the benefit-sharing system,
possibly leading to enhanced generation, accrual and
sharing of benefits (Lindhjem et al, 2010).
Results in this study indicate that in terms of non-
monetary benefit-sharing options under consideration
for the new BBNJ agreement, sharing of GSD and
research results may provide the most favourable
balance. Should monetary benefit-sharing be included
in the agreement, research funding and salaries
may represent the most fairly balanced options. In
addition, in order to reach a favourable balance, it
may be necessary to include language in the BBNJ
agreement which clearly ties benefit-sharing options
to the objectives. However, further interviews with
a larger number of participants would be needed
to draw significant conclusion for the BBNJ context.
Nonetheless, the benefit-sharing equation described and
demonstrated in this article provides a useful tool
and starting point, which can be tailored according to
different policy settings where consideration of different
benefit-sharing factors may be more appropriate. In
addition, the methodology can be developed to include
more detailed information gathered from various expert
groups to consolidate the perceived balance of beneficial
impacts versus burden associated with benefit-sharing
options.
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